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Introduction
Two main approaches have been utilized to explain the relationship between 
entrepreneurs and their investors. The first is based on the separation of ownership and 
management i.e. the so-called principal-agent approach. The second emphasizes trust and 
cooperation in the relationship. This article offers new perspectives from which to analyze the 
relationship by utilizing power constructs such as dependency, power balance/imbalance and 
different power sources in the setting. The data are based on the author’s eighteen month period 
of observation as a business angel in one entrepreneurial venture.
The relationship between entrepreneurs and their equity investors (professional venture 
capital firms and wealthy individuals known as business angels) has attracted considerable 
research attention in the last twenty years (see e.g. Denis (2004); Wright and Robbie (1998)). It 
has been suggested that a co-operative relationship is an important precondition of the 
successful development of a venture (Cable and Shane (1997)). Extensive research has thus 
been devoted to increasing our understanding of the characteristics and conditions of co­
operative relationships. From the investors’ point of view, it is essential to invest in 
entrepreneurs who are the most likely to increase the valuation of the venture and eventually 
provide investors with an exit that is several times the initial investment (Macmillan et al. 
(1985)). Entrepreneurs often seek not only capital from investors but also nonfmancial benefits,
 ^ I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Maijo-Riitta Parzefall for her comments and encouragement in earlier 
versions o f this paper. In addition, I would like to thank the participants o f the 17* AOEF conference in Pasadena 
L.A. and one anonymous referee for their valuable comments. Last but not least, my thanks go to the two 
entrepreneurs with whom I spent ahnost two years working on the project. Unfortunately, the business venture did 
not succeed but hopefully we can all learn from the project, both in an academic and practical sense. All errors and 
inconsistencies are mine.
Oskari Lehtonen is currently writing his PhD thesis at the Swedish School o f  Economics and Business 
Administration. Prior to that, he worked in the IT sector both as an entrepreneur and as an employee. His company 
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such as strategy consultation, access to networks and mental support, which can be equally 
important to their success (Sapienza et al. (1996)). Despite all efforts, the entrepreneurs’ and 
investors’ relationship is not, however, always successful and co-operative. Several reasons 
have been identified that have influenced the relationship such as asymmetric information, lack 
of trust, parties’ opportunistic behavior and change in motivation i.e. one party decides to 
proceed with another project (Cable and Shane (1997)). Investors’ detailed pre-investment 
analysis, efficient contracting and active post-investment communication are methods that are 
utilized to reduce these problems but are not always successful (Sahlman and Stevenson 
(1985)). Some authors have suggested that also entrepreneurs should analyze their investors in 
detail prior to the investment decision (Ehrlich et al. (1994)).
In this article, I shall examine power, which has previously been largely overlooked in 
this context, as a “theoretical tool” for understanding and explaining the relationship between 
entrepreneurs and their investors. Power has a very long history in organizational research and 
scholars such as Marx and Engels and Weber have already theorized the concept (Thye 
(2000)). Hundreds of articles have since been published in organizational research analyzing 
power from almost all possible viewpoints and concentrating on various aspects and 
antecedents of power. In section two, I shall go into more detail regarding some relevant 
conceptualizations of power, but the main determination remains still fairly similar. According 
to that power is ability to “get others to do things they would not otherwise do” (Baldwin 
(1980, p.501)).
As suggested, it may not be beneficial always to develop new tools and frameworks, for 
example, in entrepreneurship research but to “use the theoretical tools already developed 
within psychology, sociology, economics, and various branches o f business research^ 
(Davidsson (2003, p.52)). Accordingly, I will examine the applicability of power and more 
specifically the applicability of power and dependency, power balance/imbalance and sources 
of power i.e. coercive, reward, expert, legal/position and referent power in the context (French 
and Raven (1959); Emerson (1962); Casciaro and Piskorski (2005)).
The examination of power in the current research setting in particular seems relevant for 
the following reasons. First, power constructs have been very extensively studied in 
organizational research. For example, Pfeffer and Salancik's (1978) classic publication of 
resource dependency theory has yielded more than 2,300 citations as of spring 2002 (Pfeffer 
and Salancik (2003)). Consequently, this research tradition could potentially provide valuable 
insights into this special interfirm context: the relationship between entrepreneurs and their 
investors. In addition, for example, Santos and Eisenhardt (2005) suggest that power 
conception may be especially suitable in environments that are characterized by limited 
competition, which is common in entrepreneurial financing (Sahlman (1990)). Second, the 
power approach is very limitedly utilized in the entrepreneurial finance context. As far as I am 
aware, there is no study that has to date concentrated on power aspects in entrepreneurial 
finance. Considering the increasing importance of entrepreneurial firms for economies and job 
creation (Denis (2004)), it seems relevant to use all means available to increase our 
understanding of the phenomena. Third, previous theoretical approaches have provided 
important insights into the relationship but several critical questions remain unanswered. For 
example, different involvement levels of investors (i.e. hands-off vs. hands-on approach) have 
not shown a consistent correlation with the performance of ventures (Macmillan et al. (1989); 
Busenitz et al. (2004)). Another intriguing question is the very high emphasis investors 
(especially VCs) place, while making investment decisions, on entrepreneurs’ personal
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characteristics and experience. A common saying is that investors prefer investing in B-class 
business ideas with A-class management to A-class business ideas and B-class management. 
However, entrepreneurial research has found very little empirical support for the idea that a 
certain combination of characteristics and experience correlates with performance (Gustafsson 
(2004)) and, hence, I try to offer new insights that are needed to understand these critical issues 
better and eventually resolve them.
I shall base my analysis on the case data that I collected during a period of eighteen 
months as a business angel of one entrepreneurial venture in Finland, plus interviews and other 
qualitative material. However, where relevant, I shall link the discussion to both the formal 
venture capital and business angel contexts. When I discuss both groups together, I shall the 
use the term “investor” and when the distinction is relevant I will use the terms business angel 
(BA) and venture capitalist (VC).
I. Entrepreneurial finance and power
Business angels and professional venture capitalists constitute two main sources of 
equity funding for entrepreneurs. Business angels usually concentrate on the very early stage 
investments while professional venture capitalists prefer to invest in more mature firms. One 
way to illustrate the investment propensities of the parties is as a continuum where business 
angels represent one end and professional venture capitalists the other (van Osnabrugge and 
Robinson (1999)). Venture capitalists and business angels have other relevant differences than 
just the stages of the firms that they invest in, such as the source of capital, motivation of the 
investment, involvement level and style, and contracting mechanisms. In short, business angels 
invest their own wealth; are motivated in addition to capital gains by personal benefits accruing 
fi"om their involvement in entrepreneurial ventures; they prefer a more hands-on approach and 
style; and are not that demanding in drafting legal contracts. Professional venture capitalists, to 
the contrary, invest limited partners’ money (e.g. insurance companies and pension funds), are 
almost purely motivated by capital gains, and prefer tight legal contracting and a more hands- 
off approach (De Clerq et al. (2006)).
Below I introduce two main theoretical approaches that have been utilized to explain 
the relationship of entrepreneurs and their investors. I then discuss the current literature on 
power in entrepreneurial finance. Finally, I shall discuss the more general literature related to 
power and present a summary at the end of the section, along with four propositions that I will 
test in the following section.
A. Two main approaches to explain the investor-entrepreneur relationship
The existing literature identifies at least two main approaches^ to conceptualize 
entrepreneurs’ and their equity investors’ relationship. The first relies heavily on ideas about 
the separation of ownership and control and draws its insights from agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)). The second approach emphasizes the relational aspects of the relationship 
such as trust, respect, fairness, justice, timely feedback, and communication (Sapienza et al.
(2000)). The first approach is motivated by the idea that investors provide funding to 
entrepreneurs but are not able to control fully how entrepreneurs use that funding. Therefore, it 
is in investors’ interest both to post penalties and rewards that should influence entrepreneurs’ 
behavior, and to monitor entrepreneurs, and, hence, increase the chances that the entrepreneurs
' Other frameworks and approaches have also been utilized in entrepreneurial finance, such as resource based 
view, prisoner’s dilemma, incomplete contracting theory and transaction cost economics (Wright et al. (2003)).
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behave according to investors’ interests. Agency problems emerge for the following reasons. 
First, principals’ (i.e. VCs) and agents’ (i.e. entrepreneurs) goals are different. The VC is 
interested in maximizing the return of the investment portfolio whereas entrepreneurs might 
gain personal benefits from acting as company officers and may, therefore, not be as interested 
in increasing the value of the venture. Second, it is often difficult for principals to know what 
the agents are doing, which could in turn increase the uncertainty between partners and worsen 
the agency problem. Third, entrepreneurs and VCs have different attitudes towards risk, which 
may lead the partners into behaving differently in the same situation (De Clercq and Sapienza
(2001); Eisenhardt (1989B)).
The second approach relies on the ideas of justice theories. The main suggestion of this 
approach is that when the less powerful party (usually the entrepreneur) is treated fairly and in 
a procedurally just manner, he or she is more likely to behave according to the decision 
makers’ interests. This approach, therefore, provides insights into how the less powerful party 
(i.e. usually the entrepreneur) responds to the orders and commands of the other party. In 
addition, according to this approach, persons who are not able directly to influence the decision 
making might be interested in the fairness of decision making, and the process of decision 
making since it could provide them with a method to influence indirectly the decisions (Thibaut 
and Walker (1975)). Previous research has shown that a person’s perception of fairness has a 
significant impact on their commitment to decisions, performance, behavior and attitudes 
across many different settings (Kim and Mauborgne (1991); (1993)). Three factors have also 
been identified that influence an actor’s perceived procedural justice. First, standing is used to 
describe an actor’s status in the relationship. For example, a VC that treats entrepreneurs with 
respect and does not force its views on the entrepreneur is more likely to earn high respect and 
perceived procedural justice from the entrepreneur. Second, neutrality implies that a party (i.e. 
a VC) who makes decisions behaves neutrally towards all actors (i.e. all portfolio companies of 
the VC) and is willing to change its view when new information becomes available. Third, trust 
relates to the assurance that the decision-making party behaves trustworthily and predictably. In 
the VC-entrepreneur context, a VC that does not exploit its position in order to gain short-term 
benefits is more likely to earn high trust and accordingly perceived procedural justice from the 
entrepreneur (Busenitz et al. (2004)).
Empirical studies have shown the applicability of the constructs of ownership and 
control in the entrepreneurial finance context. For example, Sapienza and Gupta (1994) 
demonstrated that VCs can reduce entrepreneurs’ opportunistic behavior by monitoring 
entrepreneurs. Manigart et al. (2002) found evidence that monitoring should lead to a higher 
return from a portfolio company. Van Osnabrugge (2000) compared VCs’ and business angels’ 
investment processes. He utilized agency theory approach in his study and found strong support 
for agency theory’s applicability in the VC-entrepreneur relationship. He found that a VC tends 
to emphasize actions, which decreases the information asymmetry by conducting detailed 
investment analysis and concentrating on writing comprehensive investment contracts.
Similarly, attempts have been made to explain relational aspects between VCs and 
entrepreneurs. For example, Sapienza and Korsgaard (1996) utilized procedural justice theory 
in order to explain entrepreneurs’ and venture capitalists’ relationship. According to the 
authors, considerations other than economic ones play an important role in explaining the 
relationship. Busenitz et al. (1997) suggested that when the VC-entrepreneur relationship is 
weak and is not based on trust, collaborative discussions are less likely occur. In addition, the
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scholars showed that strict contract covenants utilized by VCs, and entrepreneurs’ experience, 
decrease entrepreneurs’ perceived fairness towards VCs.
In sum, both approaches have considerably advanced our knowledge and understanding 
of the investor-entrepreneur relationship and highlighted the importance of (1) contractual 
relationship, (2) post-investment monitoring and (3) trust and communication in the 
relationship. However, we still know very little of whether power that has been identified as a 
major attribute in other organizational contexts (Lee and Tiedens (2001)) has any implication in 
this context. In addition, the dynamic nature of the entrepreneur-VC relationship has attracted 
only a little attention. However, the relationship is usually in constant flux and, therefore, 
dynamic approaches are needed. For example. Cable and Shane (1997) have utilized the 
prisoner’s dilemma^ approach to explain entrepreneurs’ and VCs’ relationship. According to 
the authors, prisoner’s dilemma relates to agency theory but contains more dynamic elements 
than static agency theory and takes into account the fact that also the principal (i.e. VC) can 
behave opportunistically. The nature of prisoner’s dilemma (a multi-round setting) also covers 
the situation where a party’s behavior reacts and responds to the other party’s behavior and 
vice-versa. Similarly, in an entrepreneur-VC relationship, power can vary constantly and the 
dynamic analysis of power is well founded (e.g. longitudinal case study).
B. Power in investor-entrepreneur relationship
The power aspect between entrepreneurs and investors is rarely discussed in the 
entrepreneurial finance literature. One rare exception is Bowden’s (1994) economic study of 
bargaining power, where he argues that venture capital funds’ size influences the bargaining 
power of the investor. Cable and Shane (1997) have suggested in their conceptual paper 
utilizing prisoner’s dilemma that venture capitalists and entrepreneurs are interdependent actors 
whose success depends on the other actor’s behavior and vice-versa. Fried and Hisrich (1995) 
suggest that venture capitalists have three sources of power; money, personal relationships and 
formal power. In money power, the authors refer not to the capital that investors have put into 
the company, rather that which investors potentially may invest in the company in the future. 
The authors suggest that this source of power is strongest when the venture is performing 
poorly and the need for money is urgent and vice-versa. Relationship power is a result of 
investors’ time and effort put into the entrepreneurs’ venture, which in turn increases the 
entrepreneurs’ trust in and respect for the investors. According to the authors, this kind of 
power is mostly preferred since it is more enjoyable to use but at the same time may be hard to 
attain. Formal power is based on, for example, board, voting and liquidation rights determined 
between entrepreneurs and investors in the investment negotiations (Kaplan and Stromberg 
(2003)). According to Fried and Hisrich (1995), it may be that investors are not that willing to 
use their formal power since it is highly confrontational. In addition, the authors suggest that 
formal power is often least important to VCs and especially to early stage investors due to the 
relatively higher importance of money power. The authors largely neglect entrepreneurs’ 
power. Wright and Robbie (1998) present in their literature review article several examples of 
power in the relationship; for example, entrepreneurs’ power while negotiating additional 
funding, entrepreneurs’ power in VC backed MBOs, and the power of the parties in the exit 
decisions. Fiet et al. (1997) showed that the larger board size of VC backed ventures is less 
likely to lead to dismissal of management team members, suggesting that larger boards lack the 
cohesion that is needed for decisive actions such as dismissal. In addition, the authors showed.
See a more detailed explanation o f prisoner’s dilemma in Grant (2004).
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relating to power, that the increase of VC controlled board seats leads to increased propensity 
for dismissals. In sum, none of the above-mentioned studies have taken a more in-depth 
approach to power but have still implicitly suggested that investors have more power in the 
relationship. This leads to research question one:
Is it so that investors are more often the more powerful 
party in the relationship? 
C. Power constructs in organization research
One way in which to conceptualize power is as “a characteristic o f interpersonal 
relationships” (Lee and Tiedens (2001, p.45)). This relational perspective on power can be 
divided into two parts. The first perspective concentrates on the social aspects of power, while 
the second concentrates on the dependencies and interdependencies of the individuals (i.e. 
whose power is of interest). In the social network perspective, all individuals are organized in a 
network and one’s objective and observable position in the network determines one’s power 
over the other members of the network. The second perspective relates to individuals’ 
dependency on each other. An extensively quoted early article of Emerson (1962) explains 
power as follows: “The power of A over B is equal, and based upon, the dependency ofB upon 
A ” (p.33). In other words, the higher the dependency of an actor, the higher the power of the 
resource holder.
The constructs of power, dependency and interdependency seem especially relevant in 
entrepreneurial finance. Both investors and entrepreneurs have only a limited number of 
suitable exchange partners and high quality goods. From the investor’s point of view, once the 
investment has been made there is often no short-term substitute for the entrepreneur as an 
exchange partner, at least not without cost (Fiet et al. (1997)). The entrepreneur provides the 
investor with the possibility to participate in a high growth venture, and with future growth and 
revenue opportunities. In addition, the entrepreneur may provide for business angels the 
possibility to participate in an interesting business which provides personal benefits for the 
business angel. Investors’ “goods” that they exchange with entrepreneurs are not only funding 
but also nonfinancial advice and benefits that could help entrepreneurs to be successful and 
develop their business. Similarly, entrepreneurs do not have a broad supply of substitutes for 
the investor (Sahlman, 1990).
In addition to dependency, the concept of power balance and imbalance has attracted 
attention in organizational research and it has relevance in the entrepreneurial finance context . 
Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) have discussed in detail the power balance and imbalance 
between firms. They have showed that power balance and imbalance are two distinct 
dimensions of interdependency. A high mutual dependency between partners creates an 
incentive for them to act in a co-operative manner (i.e. absorb constraints). In contrast, in a 
scenario of power imbalance, the less powerful party may have incentive but little leverage to 
negotiate a fair deal with a more powerful party, who in turn would have little incentive and 
high negotiating power. In the entrepreneurial finance setting, a practical implication could be 
that a mutually dependent entrepreneur and investor would have more incentive to negotiate a 
fair deal and behave co-operatively compared to a situation of power imbalance between 
partners. This leads to research question two:
 ^For example, entrepreneurs’ low power and, in turn, investors’ high power may in the worst case lead to failure 
o f the venture (see e.g. Steier and Greenwood (1995)). On the other hand, it has been suggested that entrepreneurs 
possess considerable power in operational issues o f the venture (Cable and Shane (1997)).
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How does power and power balance influence the transfer of nonfinancial benefits 
and co-operation between parties?
The final aspect of power that I shall discuss is different power sources. I will utilize the 
typology that was originally developed by French and Raven (1959). It includes five power 
sources: coercive, reward, expert, legal/position and referent, which are briefly discussed 
below.
• Coercive power refers to the more powerful actors’ use of “stick” as a power source. In 
extreme cases, it could mean even a physical punishment but often it is a severe 
consequence for one who is not following the actor’s lead. In the entrepreneurial 
finance setting, it could refer to investors’ possibilities to punish entrepreneurs who are 
not following investors’ suggestions. Examples of coercive power could be the 
possibility to dismiss an entrepreneur or the denial of additional funding.
• Reward power refers to the more powerful actors’ possibilities to reward the other 
party. The reward can be either monetary or non-monetary. For example, a manager can 
offer bonuses or other incentives to well-performing employees. Reward power has a 
linkage to coercive power: depending on the actors’ behavior, the more powerful party 
can use either coercive or reward power. In the entrepreneurial finance context, 
investors have several possibilities to “reward” their portfolio firms. For example, just 
allocating investors’ time to help entrepreneurs can be a major reward for entrepreneurs 
(Sahlman (1990)).
• Expert power relates not to an actor’s formal position and the power that it bestows, but 
to the actors’ knowledge and expertise that others consider valuable. A good example is 
the increasing power of IT departments in firms. The more critical the IT systems 
become, the more power IT experts and system administrators gain. Entrepreneurs 
acquire equity funding for different reasons (Heilman and Puri (2002)). In some cases, 
the nonfinancial aspects are estimated to be even more important than the financial 
(Ehrlich et al. (1994)). This can be interpreted to lead to a situation where an 
entrepreneur who is seeking high nonfinancial benefits is more dependent and willing to 
follow the investor’s lead, in order to ensure that she/he would gain those nonfinancial 
benefits from the investor. Examples of critical nonfinancial benefits that entrepreneurs 
may be seeking are access to networks, image improvement and strategy consultation. 
Consequently, an actor that provides high expertise also possesses high expert power 
over another party to the relationship.
• Legal power relates to an actor’s legal position in the unit or group. For example, an 
investor often possesses considerable legal power that is determined in shareholder’s 
agreements and other investment documents. In addition, entrepreneurs who are a 
venture’s employees and co-owners possess legal rights.
• Referent power refers to the situation where a skilful user of such power gets people to 
do things without force, expertise and formal position, but just by being “such a nice
guy”.
The discussion of the different power sources above leads to the third and final research 
question:
What are parties’ power sources and do they vary according to situation?
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II. Methodology and data
The data for this article are based on my eighteen month period as an investor in one 
entrepreneurial venture in Finland. The involvement started during summer 2004 and ended in 
winter 2005. During that period, I systematically stored all the material that was distributed and 
produced. In addition, after the involvement, I conducted four interviews with the 
entrepreneurs. Below, I discuss in more detail the data sources, data collection, participant 
observation methodology and case study research that this article is based on.
Data collection for empirical research projects usually starts with random sampling, 
meaning that a sample of observations is collected from the population in which the 
characteristics are of interest. In case study research, it is often theoretical sampling that is 
being utilized (Glaser and Strauss (1967)). The purpose of theoretical sampling is not to choose 
observations randomly but to select cases that should represent the phenomena of interest well, 
and in which access deep under the surface is possible. The purpose is that by gaining such 
access it is possible to research complex constructs and, for example, causalities, better than in 
surveys. When studying complex constructs, such as power and the dynamics of power, a deep 
understanding is especially important.
A. Data sources
In entrepreneurial financing, the empirical studies are based on either one side of the 
relationship (e.g. surveys of entrepreneurs or investors) (see e.g. Van Osnabrugge (2000) or 
Barney et al. (1996)) or cover both sides of the relationship (see e.g. Sapienza (1992)) The third 
group of studies relies on secondary information such as data from Venture Economics or 
Venture One (see e.g. Gompers (1995)). The fourth category is in-depth case studies (see e.g. 
Sweeting and Wong (1997)). My approach follows the latter research tradition. The data cover, 
for example, over 300 e-mails, 15 discursive sessions (using Skype voIP software), 11 versions 
of business plans, six versions of the shareholder’s agreement and investment agreement. In 
addition, I have conducted foxir interviews with the entrepreneurs. The interviews were mostly 
transcribed applying the “24-hours’ rule” (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988)).
B. Case study research and participant observation methodology
The purpose of the research project is to examine the applicability of power constructs 
in the entrepreneur-investor relationship. I have derived research questions fi-om the theory and 
existing research, and answered them using case study methods such as pattern matching, the 
presentation of rival explanations, establishing a chain of evidence, and emphasizing quotes 
and narratives fi-om the data. Data collection has been achieved, among other means, through 
participant observation methodology which, according to Yin (2003), is a special data 
collection method where a researcher can have at least four kinds of role: (1) a member of the 
setting, (2) a partially active member of the setting, (3) an active member of the setting and (4) 
a key member of the setting. My role in the setting most closely resembled that of a key 
member.
Case studies have been used in the entrepreneurial context before but participant 
observation methodology has rarely been employed in the entrepreneurial setting. I was able to 
find only one example in the entrepreneurial finance context, namely Silva’s (2004) study of a 
Portuguese venture capital firm’s investment strategy and process. However, several aspects
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speak for using this kind of methodology. First, it is very difficult to obtain data on venture 
capital investments, especially in longitudinal form. The same applies to business angel 
investments. Angels often want to remain anonymous and acquire information about potential 
deals through intermediaries (van Osnabrugge (2000)). Second, it is not necessarily possible to 
get answers concerning complex issues such as power in the relations and the dynamic nature 
of power from interviewees in a few interviews or surveys. This viewpoint is supported by 
Beaver and Jennings (2005, p.21):
“Researching small business management competence and the quest for 
competitive advantage is fraught with difficulties. The relationship between 
enterprise performance and management action and inaction is extremely 
tenuous and very difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate conclusively. Only 
those persons immediately affected by organizational events have sufficient 
knowledge of the precise circumstances to be able to suggest cause and effect 
relationships.”
Third, it is suggested that current venture capital research projects that are either based 
on surveys or secondary databases need additional data sources to increase our understanding 
of the phenomenon (such as observation studies) (Fenn and Liang (1998)).
C. Evaluation of the quality of the research
Key concerns promoted, for example, by Yin (2003) in case study research -  reliability, 
construct validity, internal and external validities -  were considered in detail when I designed, 
conducted and finally wrote the research project report. Internal validity, relating to cause-and- 
effect relationships, was increased by conducting multiple interviews, a careful analysis of 
different data sources, pattern matching and the presentation of rival explanations. The 
generalizability of the results outside of this data (i.e. external validity) was conducted by 
utilizing the existing literature and analytical generalization. The third concern promoted by 
Yin (2003), construct validity, was a major issue since I participated actively in the research 
setting. I have increased construct validity primarily through the extensive utilization of various 
data sources, key informants’ review of the report, and the establishment of a detailed chain of 
evidence between analysis, propositions and data. Reliability was increased using the case 
study process framework promoted by Eisenhardt (1989A). The same framework was used by 
Fried and Hisrich (1995) in their study of a rare example of power in the entrepreneurial 
finance context. In addition, I established a common database for all material and a “data 
room” where the data were analyzed in a consistent manner. I have summed up the four key 
concerns of the case study research, following the example of Sarker and Lee (2003, p.818), in 
Table L
III. The investment and power relationships
In this section, I will discuss my involvement with the entrepreneurs by concentrating 
on the power aspects. The venture had been operating as a part-time hobby of the two founders 
for approximately two years before my involvement. There were no additional employees. The 
venture sold DVD movies on the internet. The founders wanted to import a new movie rental 
concept from the U.S to Finland, where the venture was operating.. The concept had been very 
successful in the U.S. The business idea was fairly straightforward. Customers paid a fixed
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monthly fee, selected movies online and the movies were then delivered to the customers by 
mail. The customers could keep the movies for as long as they wanted but they could not 
receive new movies prior to returning the previous ones by mail.
The initial contact between the entrepreneurs and myself was established in June 2004.1 
became interested in the business opportunity presented by entrepreneur ONE"^ . They were not 
actively looking for an investor but rather searching for different methods to finance their 
venture. I became interested mainly because the business concept had been extremely 
successful in the U.S., and because there were no competing businesses in Finland at that time. 
I also recognized an opportunity since the entrepreneurs needed additional finance and it was 
unlikely that they would be able to raise it without more experienced people committed in the 
venture. Consequently, I negotiated that I would get approximately 1/6 of the shares in retum 
for a small capital installment and “sweat equity” that I was willing to put into the venture.
I did not have an official operational role in the venture. I acted in an advisory capacity 
and, in addition, helped to put together a business plan and raised some additional debt 
financing and grants from governmental sources. I also helped to launch the service and had a 
seat on the company’s board along with the entrepreneurs. There were no additional board 
members. My motivation for the investment was primarily to get involved in the 
entrepreneurial venture and secondarily for financial gain.
It took almost a year from the initial contact to launch the service. After only three 
months in operation, the entrepreneurs came to the final conclusion that the service was not 
going to succeed. The main reason for the termination of the project was the lack of customers 
resulting from the highly unprofessional graphic design of the service. Due to its successful 
launch, the concept was able to attract a considerable number of people to the website, but 
potential customers were not willing to sign up due to the image that the poor design created. 
The second reason was that the profit per customer was much lower than we had anticipated^.
Interviews with the entrepreneurs clearly showed that they were concerned about the 
control of the firm before they agreed to my investment. For example, they agreed beforehand 
that should problems arise they would always team up against me. This was presented by 
entrepreneur TWO in the following quote:
[E lf :  “We agreed beforehand that in case of disagreements we [the 
entrepreneurs] would discuss the issue together and decide the best course o f action for 
ourselves [so that our interests would be protected]. ”
Prior to and after the investment we worked hard to develop the concept. During the 
development phase, I tried to offer my advice and, for example, made several suggestions about 
the content of the service. I also emphasized some aspects that I felt to be especially important, 
such as improved communication among us, and the image which the service created for the 
customers. Consequently, I made specific suggestions about how we could improve these
In order to preserve anonymity, I shall call the entrepreneurs ONE and TWO.
 ^ This was due to various reasons, such as: 1) customers returned movies sooner than what we expected which 
increased our postal fees 2) Finnish postal agency charged more postal fees than what they had originally quoted 
due to their own error, 3) more movies got broken and lost than what we had anticipated 4) movies cost more than 
what we had expected due to the reason that movie distributors added extra shipping fees that we had not 
anticipated when they delivered the movies. All these costs decreased our profit per customer considerably.
 ^ I will refer to these interviews and e-mail quotes later in Table II and the text and, hence, I have numbered them 
as evidence (E l, E2 etc.).
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aspects and ensure that they would be sufficiently taken care of. For example, I suggested that 
in order to improve the quality of the graphic design and user interface of the software, we 
should consider recruiting additional resources. In addition, I pointed out that it is very risky for 
only one person to be responsible for all software development, which was highly critical to the 
business. I even suggested a suitable person to aid in the software development. However, the 
entrepreneurs turned these suggestions down as a quote from an e-mail on April 5*, 2005 
illustrates:
[E2]; ‘7 or [entrepreneur TWO] do not see that we need additional 
programming resources. Therefore we can forget this issue. Let’s see if  there is a need 
for that later but now there is none. ”
In addition, I made several suggestions as to how we could improve marketing. For 
example, I suggested that we should have a marketing plan where we would broadly define at a 
high level the targets of our marketing attempts. My suggestions were largely ignored.
Returning to the power sources presented by French and Raven (1959): coercive, 
reward, expert, legal and referent power, and the concept of power imbalance (see e.g. Casciaro 
and Piskorski (2005)), it seems that I had very limited power in the relationship. I did not have 
any coercive power or in fact any real interest in using coercive power. I did not possess any 
considerable reward power, since I was not in a position to provide any large-scale additional 
funding for the entrepreneurs. Neither did I possess any other resource that would have been 
valuable to the entrepreneurs. I may have had some expert and referent power but they were 
fast deteriorating. Entrepreneur TWO explained that at first they tried to follow and implement 
my suggestions in detail but soon decided that “there are more important matters”. According 
to entrepreneur TWO, it seems that an investor with relevant experience and reputation would 
have possessed more power in the relationship, as the following quote shows:
[E3]; ‘'If we would have had a person who would have been familiar with movie 
business as an investor, I believe that he would have been able to provide instantly 
ideas that would be aligned with business logic o f that particular business area. ”
The following quote from an e-mail from entrepreneur ONE also implies that my 
referent power was very limited in the relationship (e-mail dated May 16^ ,^ 2005):
[E4]; “If we had a real venture capitalist as an investor, o f course we would 
provide the information that he would require. ”
In other words, more relevant experience and reputation would have provided more 
power for the venture’s investor. However, I did not possess the critical resources that the 
entrepreneurs assessed as valuable, nor did I manage to influence the entrepreneurs by using 
referent power or any other power source. Consequently, I maintained very little power in the 
relationship.
Due to my low power, I also had problems in getting information about what was going 
on in the venture. I, for example, sent correspondence saying that I would be interested in 
knowing what is going on in order to provide usefiil comments for and timely help to the 
entrepreneurs. However, due to time constraints, the entrepreneurs were not very concerned
about the information that I was getting, as entrepreneur ONE wrote in his e-mail of May 16^ ,^ 
2005:
[E5]; “Of course information comes to you later [days or in some occasions 
weeks], hut the main point is that we know what we are doing. ”
The next two quotes from entrepreneur TWO after it was certain that the venture was 
going to fail illustrate the obvious dilemma (i.e. that my comments were actually considered 
valuable):
[E6]; “It was damn good that you scrutinized our plans in such detail... [it saved 
us from putting even more effort and resources on the failing project], ” and:
[E7]; “Since you looked at the business from the outside you provided quite 
wild ideas, which might have been the answer if we would have executed them [i.e. the 
venture would not have failed]. ”
At least two aspects emerge from these experiences. First, since my power was very 
limited and even though I saw serious shortcomings and tried to react to them, my suggestions 
and advice were largely disregarded. This was really problematic for me since my initial 
motivation to invest was to get involved in a new and exciting venture. The entrepreneurs’ 
opinions illustrate well how they thought about the investors. First, a quote from entrepreneur 
ONE and then from TWO:
[E8]; “It is ok that an investor interacts and provides help but without question 
the entrepreneurs should always have the final say on any given issue. If for example, it 
is not possible to reach a compromise then the entrepreneurs ’ opinion should win. ”
[E9]; “When there was a conflict o f opinions the majority decided [i.e. usually 
the entrepreneurs ’ opinion]. ”
The entrepreneurs’ view of the investors’ role is very different from that, for example, 
which professional venture capitalists favor (see e.g. Pratch (2005)), and also business angels 
tend to get involved more closely in the ventures they invest in (Van Osnabrugge (2000)). From 
my point of view, i.e. a person who wanted to be involved in an entrepreneurial venture, I soon 
learned that it was not that easy to influence an entrepreneurial venture and that I would not get 
the personal benefits from the investment that I had expected.
Second aspect that emerges from the mismatch between my attempt to provide advice 
and the entrepreneurs’ reluctance to listen is why was the communication and advising so 
difficult? Especially since the entrepreneurs admitted later that they should have paid more 
attention to my propositions. Entrepreneur TWO’s quotes shed some light on this aspect:
[EIO]; “I think that we had some kind of a collision of cultures here. Your 
communication style is very aggressive [direct] and if one is not used to it one may end 




In order to illustrate his point, entrepreneur TWO gives a short example about a board 
member of another firm:
[E ll];  “This particular board member tells a story, who knows whether it is 
imaginary or not, with many illustrative examples and listeners usually discover 
themselves what he is suggesting. This style does not criticize anybody personally and 
could have w'orked well in our firm as well ”
In other words, the explanation offered by entrepreneur TWO was that the 
entrepreneurs were not willing to listen to the comments and advice since the communication 
method was wrong (too aggressive and direct) for them7 According to Cousins (2002) and 
Casciaro and Piskorski (2005), given high power imbalance the more powerful party tends to 
place less emphasis on the less powerful party’s opinions and interests. Consequently, the 
entrepreneurs’ high power may have lead to the situation where they did not want to put more 
effort into those issues that they did not see as useful.
We launched the service in July 2005 and got a lot of publicity in the Finnish press 
considering the size of the venture. However, after only one month entrepreneur ONE’s belief 
in the concept started to shake. He wrote in his e-mail of August 9^ ,^ 2005:
[E l2]; “We have had visitors from 6000 different IP-addresses [meaning 
different customers had visited the service’s website] and we have gotten 40 
customers... In addition our profit per customer is on average 1.5 euros per month... In 
sum my feeling o f success on a scale 0-100 is pretty close to zero ”
After that e-mail we started seriously to analyze our options. I suggested that we should 
try to intensify our efforts to attract customers and openly evaluate possibilities to co-operation 
with other players. We decided that we would wait one more month and meanwhile try to 
increase the number of customers considerably. Unfortunately, the results were not very 
encouraging and, hence, we started to look for an exit. I had used common stock when I 
invested in the venture and I did not have the protection of a liquidation preference clause. This 
put me in a very unfavorable situation in a low valuation trade sale or in liquidation. Therefore,
I had an incentive to continue the venture even though the possibility for success was very low. 
However, the entrepreneurs disagreed and wanted to exit the business as soon as possible. After 
a few months of searching, the entrepreneurs found an owner of a video rental chain that 
wanted to expand into the mail rental business, and they agreed to sell the business to him at a 
lower valuation than that we had put into the venture.
The shareholder’s agreement stated that all board members should agree on major 
decisions including ownership restructurings and changes to board membership. This clause 
provided me with an effective method to veto unfavorable decisions that were considered 
“major”. Even though I was against the trade sale, I had very few options to make the 
entrepreneurs actually do something that they would not otherwise want to do i.e. to continue 
the venture’s business in one way or another. Due to my limited options, I offered the
 ^ It seems that the communication style was a major issue that caused a great many problems between us. Previous 
research has emphasized the importance o f communication between investors and entrepreneurs (see e.g. Busenitz 
et al. (2004)). Interestingly, correct communication style has not received in-depth attention and could be a subject 
for future research. However, this research project does not concentrate on it.
64
entrepreneurs the possibility to buy back my shares at a lower valuation than I had initially paid 
for them, but still a higher valuation than what my share of the proceeds of the trade sale would 
have been. The entrepreneurs, who wanted to exit the firm as soon as possible, did not have any 
other realistic options than to agree to the proposition, and I sold my shares back to them before 
the venture’s business was sold to the third party.
Based on the case description above, it is probably clear that the entrepreneurs held 
considerable power over me and the power was imbalanced in our relationship. Based on the 
interview data, it seems that the power imbalance had influenced the entrepreneurs’ willingness 
to evaluate seriously the suggestions that I made. Based on the existing literature, it has been 
suggested that VCs in particular possess high power over entrepreneurs and their power bases 
are legal, expert, coercive and sometimes referent and reward power. Business angels, who 
prefer post-investment involvement, may consequently utilize more expert and referent power 
compared to the other power sources. In my case, the entrepreneurs held considerable power 
over the investor. This is particularly interesting since the existing research suggests that 
entrepreneurs’ power may decrease when their venture is not developing according to plan 
(Fredriksen and Klofsten (2001)). In our case, the venture was developing poorly but still the 
entrepreneurs held considerable power and actually their power increased as a result of the poor 
development. In more detail, the entrepreneurs held considerable power relating to the day-to- 
day operations of the venture and the strategy of the venture, and they disregarded suggestions 
that I made. However, I would have been very reluctant to invest additional funds in the 
venture. Also, due to the high risk and fairly pessimistic outlook for the venture, it would have 
been difficult for me to dismiss the entrepreneurs (it was very unlikely that anybody would 
have been interested in starting to work in the venture on similar terms), and this provided them 
with considerable but only partial power. Utilizing the power dependency typology, I was more 
dependent on the entrepreneurs than they were on me. However, the power dependency was 
related to day-to-day activities and business strategy aspects.
Relating to the second research question of transfer of nonfinancial benefits and co­
operation, the entrepreneurs disregarded suggestions that were not attractive from their point of 
view or they gave them “two seconds” before they did so, as confessed by entrepreneur TWO. 
However, entrepreneur TWO confirmed in the interviews that this led to a situation where most 
of the ideas, even good ones, were rejected since the entrepreneurs used their power and 
decided to do things their way. This suggests that power balance influences the transfer of 
nonfinancial benefits and co-operation. A similar aspect was identified by Casciaro and 
Piskorski (2005).
I was not entirely powerless in the relationship, and, due to my legal power, I was able 
to negotiate a fairly good exit from the unprofitable business. I also had some power when we 
started our relationship, but soon the entrepreneurs started to disregard my suggestions and 
requests (my referent power was decreasing). The entrepreneurs also admitted that if they had 
had an experienced venture capitalist as an investor, they would have behaved differently 
(suggesting that a professional venture capitalist would have possessed more referent power). 
Finally, I had some expert power while I negotiated additional financing from the government. 
In turn, the entrepreneurs had high power that was mainly based on their formal position as 
company executives (legal power) and on my limited possibilities to find replacements for the 
entrepreneurs (partly expert power).
In Table II, I present the summary of the research questions and case study evidence.
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IV. Discussion
In this paper, I have examined power in the relationship between investors and 
entrepreneurs. I have employed the case study approach and participant observation method. I 
have been able to document and analyze in depth one entrepreneurial venture’s interactions 
based on actual decisions and behavior. In addition, I have interviewed the entrepreneurs 
afterwards to examine their perceptions of power in even more detail.
As my data and the power literature suggest, it seems that power constructs are 
constantly present in the relationship and they influence actors’ behavior. It also seems clear 
that power is a more complex construct in the entrepreneurial finance context than Fried and 
Hisrich (1995) have suggested. Contrary to their propositions, this study suggests that it is not 
always the investor who has the power. Entrepreneurs have power that is drawn from different 
power sources, such as legal and expertise power. Constructs such as dependency, power 
balance/imbalance, and different power sources, contain all important issues that could help us 
understand the relationship between entrepreneurs and investors better, and also in an optimal 
situation to influence the actors’ behavior.
Further studies on power could first benefit by making a distinction between different 
power sources. For example, Pfeffer (1992) suggests that acknowledging various power 
sources is in itself a major power source. From the investors’ point of view, it may be crucial to 
build different power sources. For example, VCs’ high emphasis on extensive ex-ante 
contracting (referring mainly to coercive, reward and legal power sources) seems somewhat 
limitative. VCs’ own interest and that of their limited partners requires them to ensure that the 
capital is invested as efficiently as possible. Based on my analysis, the development of 
additional power sources could help to reach that goal. It may also be the case that the 
importance of different power sources depends on the development phase of the portfolio firm. 
For example. Fried and Hisrich (1995) have suggested that formal power is more important at 
the later stages of ventures. Similarly, the importance of fairness and trust in the entrepreneur- 
VC relationship (Busenitz et al. (1997)) can be interpreted to support the recommendation of 
additional power sources such as referent power.
The typical business angel strategy of extensive ex-post involvement is not ideal either. 
By concentrating on building a relationship, referent and expert power may be sufficient on 
some occasions but probably situations arise when legal power, for example, is needed. My 
agreement with the entrepreneurs illustrates this. Due to the lack of a liquidation preference 
clause or usage of convertible preferred shares, I was at risk of losing almost all my investment. 
But the clause in the shareholders’ agreement that provided me with a veto on any changes in 
the ownership structure gave me a good negotiating position that eventually made the 
entrepreneurs buy back my shares. The second important insight into power constructs relates 
to business angels’ high need to get involved in the venture’s business. With low power this 
may be impossible, and, therefore, the development of various power bases may be essential 
for business angels.
The identification of and building different power sources is also important for 
entrepreneurs. For example, one major concern for entrepreneurs who are acquiring equity 
financing is the loss of control of their firm (Shepherd and Zacharakis (2001)). Also, my data 
(see El) revealed a similar fear among the entrepreneurs. However, the skilfiil utilization of 
different power sources may help entrepreneurs to stay in better control of their firms. In sum, 
different power sources all play an important, partially complementary and partially 
overlapping, role in the investor-entrepreneur relationship. Their importance may vary
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depending on the situation and stage of the firm’s development. In order for the parties to 
manage their relationships successfully, all power sources may be needed, not necessarily 
constantly but occasionally during the relationship.
Another interesting aspect that emerges from the research data and previous power 
literature is the question of the amount of power between parties and power balance. It has 
practical implications and could be a target for further academic research. For example, in my 
case data the (powerful) entrepreneurs agreed afterwards that they should have considered 
some of the suggestions more carefully during the relationship. On the other hand, there are 
also illustrative examples of where the investor’s decisions are argued to have destroyed the 
entire venture or at least seriously delayed its development (see e.g. Steier and Greenwood 
(1995)). Without high investor power it is less likely to happen. Therefore, the question of what 
is the correct amount of power and power balance between entrepreneurs and their investors 
becomes significant. One way to illustrate this question is to consider three scenarios: first, 
power imbalance between a powerful investor and powerless entrepreneur; second, the opposite 
scenario; and a third scenario of power balance. The obvious question is whether one of the 
scenarios would be optimal compared with the others for the co-operative relationship or is it 
so that the venture’s industry or stage could have implications for optimal/suboptimal power 
between partners.
My data and previous research give some indicative answers. In scenario one, regarding 
high power imbalance in favor of entrepreneurs, it could mean that nonfinancial contributions 
potentially provided by the investor are less likely to be adapted by the entrepreneur (as 
happened in our case). In addition, it may be that the business angel is not going to gain the 
personal benefits that he/she expected from the investment. The opposite scenario of high 
power imbalance in favor of investors could mean that entrepreneurs, who often have a high 
need for independence (Brandstatter (1997)), will lose their motivation to work on behalf of the 
venture. On the other hand, sometimes investors will replace the entrepreneur who they 
perceive to be performing inadequately, and, on these occasions, the low motivation of 
entrepreneurs is not a problem for investors, due to the fact that investors believe that 
dismissals increase the performance of the firms (Bruton et al. (1997)). In sum, it is likely that 
both parties would prefer as high power as possible, but if the interest lies on the transfer of 
nonfinancial benefits and co-operation between partners, which should in turn increase the 
performance of the venture, then a more balanced distribution of power may be preferable as 
illustrated in scenario 2 (Casciaro and Piskorski (2005)). The three scenarios are presented in 
Figure 1.
One aspect that speaks for the utilization of power constructs in entrepreneurial finance 
is that power is virtually always needed when getting things done involves more than an actors 
own efforts. When we want to get things done, we virtually always need to influence people 
who are not in our chain of command. In other words, we depend on the people we cannot 
influence officially or at the very least our power is very limited compared to our 
responsibilities (Pfeffer (1992)). One method to influence the actors that are outside our sphere 
of (official) influence could be the skilful utilization of power. In the entrepreneurial finance 
setting, this phenomenon is very well presented.
Another intriguing fact that speaks for using power constructs in the entrepreneurial 
setting is that the power research tradition is much more developed than the entrepreneurship or 
entrepreneurial finance research tradition. Consequently, and following for example 
Davidsson’s (2003) suggestion concerning the utilization of previously tested
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operationalizations of variables in entrepreneurial research, we could find more empirically 
validated constructs that we could then test in the entrepreneur-investor context.
This study is based on the data of one relationship (i.e. a single case study) and, 
therefore, caution is needed when interpreting the results (Yin (2003)). In addition, I have 
employed a rather unorthodox approach by being an active participant in the research setting, 
even though it has been suggested that this is “within the limits” of participant observation 
methodology (Yin (2003)). The biggest concern the approach raises is the question of 
objectivity, I have attempted to limit the problem of construct validity (Yin (2003)) by 
extensively documenting and presenting the data. In addition, I have linked my arguments and 
insights to the existing literature on power and entrepreneurship, which should further increase 
objectivity. Moreover, to argue on behalf of the data collection method, without my active 
involvement it would have been impossible to obtain as detailed data as I was able to collect 
during my 18 months period of involvement with the entrepreneurs.
The second important issue to be noted is that previous power research outside the 
investor-entrepreneur setting is very broad and established. However, I have concentrated on 
only a very small portion of aspects within the notion of power, and at the same time have 
excluded other interesting and without doubt relevant concepts and constructs that most likely 
would have equally advanced the understanding of the relationship. For example, by choosing 
to examine power sources originally presented by French and Raven (1959), I have also 
disregarded some other sources of power (Morgan (1986)). Therefore, a more in-depth analysis 
of power in the entrepreneur-investor context could be of interest than can be conducted in one 
academic article.
The final limitation, and at the same time a suggestion for future research, is the depth 
of various contract covenants and other agreement structures between entrepreneurs and 
investors. In our relationship, my right of veto on changes in the ownership structure provided 
me with a fairly good negotiating position and power that made the entrepreneurs buy back my 
shares. However, there are various other contract covenants. Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) 
have divided them into cash-flow rights, board rights, voting rights, liquidation rights and other 
control rights. In addition, an effective method to control entrepreneurs is the staged financing 
which VCs commonly use (Gompers (1995)). It could be very interesting to analyze in more 
detail the association between various contract covenants and power between partners. In my 
relationship, I had some power based on the investment agreement but the entrepreneurs 
neglected that by disregarding my suggestions for the best strategy for the firm. Since I had no 
effective methods to discipline the entrepreneurs for their behavior, I had to agree with them 
against my will and my power was low. The interesting question remains as to whether this is a 
common phenomenon or just an isolated incident.
Despite its limitations, my article sheds light on the role of power in the investor- 
entrepreneur relationship. I suggest that power constructs in entrepreneurial financing could 
provide several interesting research avenues and could even help us to understand what the 
optimal building block for a co-operative relationship between entrepreneurs and their investors 
would be. Going back to the one determination of power, “get others to do things they would 
not otherwise do” (Baldwin (1980, p.501)), is something that both entrepreneurs and their 
investors try to do continuously in their relationships, and therefore a more detailed academic 
analysis of that determinant would be well founded.
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Key concerns in case study research
Key concern in case study Suggestions from the literature 








Address rival explanations 
Use o f  theory/existing literature
Analytical generalization 
Using multiple sources o f  evidence
Having key informants review the
case study report
Establishing a chain o f evidence
Developing a case study protocol
Creating/maintaining a case study 
database
Research questions derived jfrom the 
literature were matched with empirical 
patterns.
Rival explanations were presented. 
Existing literature was used to make 
connections between research data and 
the formal venture capital context.
The data were generalized to power 
theories.
1) Participant observations during a 
period o f 18 months, 2) multiple 
interviews with both informants, 3) 
over 300 e-mail and other documents 
and material.
Both entrepreneurs have reviewed an 
earlier version o f this report.
Extensive linkage to interviews and 
other data in analysis.
Protocol was developed utilizing 
Eisenhardt’s (1989A) suggestions 
including literature review, proposals, 
semi-structured questionnaires etc.
All data were stored in digital form on 
a hard drive. In addition, a “data room” 
was established where data were 
analyzed in a consistent manner.______
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Table II
Three research questions and links to data.
Research question Notes Links to evidence
R Q l: Is it so that investors are 
more often the more powerful 
party in the relationship?
RQ2: How does power and 
power balance influence the 
transfer o f  nonfmancial benefits 
and co-operation between 
parties?
RQ3: What are parties’ power 
sources and do they vary 
according to situation?
It seems that the investor’s power 
was very limited in this case. I had 
some referent power but it decreased 
when the relationship developed. My 
main power source was legal power 
during exit negotiations.
Based on the data, the entrepreneurs’ 
high power enabled them to 
disregard suggestions. In other 
words, power imbalance decreases 
co-operation and transfer o f  
nonfinancial benefits. However, a 
rival explanation could be that the 
communication method was wrong. 
The entrepreneurs’ power was based 
on legal and partly expert power. The 
investor's power was based first on 
referent power but later mainly on 
legal power. In sum, power is based 
on various sources and it changes 
according to situation.______________
E 1,E 2, E 3,E 4, E5, E8 and E9
E5, E6 and E7. See also ElO 
and E l 1 which suggest that a 
wrong communication style 
may have been the reason for 
the rejection o f nonfinancial 
contributions.
E1,E3,E4,  E8and E9

